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Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural
Model for FCC Comparative Broadcast License
Renewal Hearings
The Federal Communications Commission is charged by the
Federal Communications Act' with allocating use of the public air-
waves by dispensing renewable broadcast licenses for particular fre-
quencies on the basis of the "public convenience, interest or necess-
ity.12 Although the FCC's task3 is much more difficult whenever two
or more applicants apply for the use of the same or interfering fre-
quencies, the Commission has over the years at least been able to
set standards for choosing among original applicants through the
procedure known as the comparative broadcast hearing.4 Where, on
the other hand, one of the applicants is a current incumbent apply-
ing for renewal of its license and a so-called comparative renewal
hearing is held, the FCC's record has been poorer:5 it did not issue
a policy statement regarding comparative renewal hearings until
1970,6 and this policy was vacated by the D.C. Court of Appeals.7
47 U.S.C. §§ 301-98 (1970).
47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970). The initial license grant, and subsequent renewals, may not
exceed three years in duration. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970).
The terms "FCC" and "Commission" will be used interchangeably.
See text and notes at notes 22-60 infra.
The comparative renewal hearing has been the subject of considerable controversy in
recent years. See, e.g., Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process in Television: Problems and
Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. REv. 471 (1975); Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"-The
Aftermath of WHDH in FCC License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1014, (1970); Hyde,
FCC Policy and Procedures Relating to Hearings on Broadcast Applications in Which a Neu,
Applicant Seeks to Displace a Licensee Seeking Renewal, 1975 DUKE L.J. 253 [hereinafter
cited as Hyde]; Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARV. L.
RKv. 1693 (1969); Comment, Media Reform Through Comparative License Renewal Proce-
dures-The Citizens Case, 57 IOWA L. REv. 912 (1972); Comment, The FCC and Broadcasting
License Renewals: Perspectives on WHDH, 36 U. CHI. L. RFV. 854 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as CHICA;O COMMENT]; Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or
Protection of Mediocrity? 118 U. PA. L. REv. 368 (1970).
Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C. 2d 424, 18 P & F RADiO REG. 2D 1901 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Policy Statement].
7 Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (1971). The Federal Communi-
cations Act provides for direct appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit from most decisions
and orders of the FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970). As virtually all judicial review of FCC action
is by the District of Columbia Circuit, the term "Court of Appeals" refers to that court
whenever used in the text unless otherwise noted.
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The Commission has been plagued by an inability to reconcile the
statutory command that a licensee acquires no vested interest by
virtue of initially having been granted a license8 with its perception
that it is unfair to compel a licensee to forfeit its investment by
denying renewal in favor of another applicant.9
This comment critically examines the comparative renewal
hearing as a mechanism for rational license allocation. After detail-
ing certain procedural requirements common to all comparative
hearings, the comment traces the development of the criteria cur-
rently applied in ordinary comparative broadcast hearings and
demonstrates how they have evolved from a means for predicting
the performance of individual licensees to a mechanism for imple-
menting policies regarding the structure of the broadcast industry.
The comment then examines how the Commission's reluctance to
apply these structural policies to incumbent licensees has led it to
disregard its own comparative criteria in comparative renewal hear-
ings and to follow the policy that the Court of Appeals found objec-
tionable. The comment concludes that the comparative renewal
hearing as it is currently administered is inherently incapable of
choosing between incumbent licensees and challengers. Finally, the
comment proposes a procedure designed to enable the Commission
to make selections between incumbents and challengers on the basis
of objective policies and demonstrates that such a procedure could
avoid the objections that led the court to invalidate the Commis-
sion's previous approach.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMPARATIVE HEARING
A. The Requirement of a Comparative Broadcast Hearing
The Communications Act requires the Commission to grant
applications for licenses for up to three years whenever the "public
convenience, interest or necessity will be served thereby,"'" but pro-
hibits the Commission from denying a license" or renewal applica-
tion without allowing the applicant a hearing. The Act does not,
however, specify procedures for consideration of mutually exclusive
applications-contemporaneous applications for stations that
47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 304, 307(d), 309(h) (1970).
See. e.g., Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp. (WTHI-TV), 35 F.C.C. 677, 1 P & F RADIO
RF.. 2) 573 (1963); Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149, 6 P & F RADIO REc. 994,
af'd on reconsideration, 16 F.C.C. 141, 6 P & F RADIO REG. 1036d (1951).
47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970). See also 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970).
47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970). But see text at notes 178-81 infra.
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would intolerably interfere with each others' signals. In order to
ensure that the Commission does not frustrate either applicant's
right to a hearing, the courts have read certain requirements into
the Act.
In Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,1 3 the Commission had before
it applications for mutually exclusive licenses; it granted one while
setting the other for a later hearing. Even though the "loser's" right
to a hearing had been preserved in form, the Supreme Court held
that the Commission's procedure had effectively frustrated the
"loser's" right to a hearing by converting its hearing into a proceed-
ing to revoke the license of the first applicant. The Supreme Court
labeled such a hearing "an empty thing." 4 The Commission imple-
mented the Court's mandate to grant all bona fide mutually exclu-
sive applicants an effective hearing before dispensing the license"5
by providing for a consolidated comparative broadcast hearing.
The heart of the comparative hearing is the "standard compar-
ative issue"-the determination of which of the basically qualified
applicants, if any, will best serve the public interest, convenience
and necessity."6 Since the comparative hearing is not expressly pro-
vided for in the Act, the Commission would seem to be free to
develop its own standards for the hearing. Although this is largely
true, in Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC," the Court of Appeals
held that the Commission could not "make findings in respect to
selected characteristics only," but had to base its decision on a
consideration of all of the relevant differences between the appli-
cants.11 The Johnston court did not, however, attempt to specify all
relevant factors, but left that determination to the Commission.
Despite the teaching of Ashbacker, the Commission does not
always grant a hearing before denying an application. The leading
case upholding the authority of the Commission to deny applica-
tions without hearing is United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,'"
where an applicant who held more media interests than permitted
.326 U.S. 327 (1945).
Id. at 330-31.
Id. at 333.
" Other issues, which are noncomparative, such as the basic qualifications of the appli-
cants, may also be considered in the comparative hearing. See text at notes 131-44 infra.
175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
' Id. at 357. The FCC implements this mandate by granting applicants "preferences"
and "demerits" of varying weights according to their showing in comparison with all other
applicants on each comparative criterion, and then making the final decision on the basis of
the applicants' overall records of preferences and demerits.
" 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
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by the Commission's multiple ownership rules was denied a license
without a hearing. Storer has been followed in a number of cases
where applicants had failed to satisfy the Commission's reasonable
qualification standards:" the courts have correctly reasoned that
little would be served-despite the statutory command-by requir-
ing the Commission to provide a hearing to an applicant whose
application is demonstrably inadequate.
Ashbacker, Johnston and Storer therefore establish principles
of major importance. The FCC is basically free to determine what
factors it will rely on in deciding between mutually exclusive appli-
cants. But once this decision has been made, the Commission must
allow all qualified applicants to participate in a comparative hear-
ing to determine which is the best applicant on a consideration of
all the relevant factors. These principles apply whether or not one
of the applicants is an incumbent.2'
B. Factors Used in Determining the Comparative Issue
Since 1965, the Commission has followed its Policy Statement
on Comparative Broadcast Hearings2 (1965 Policy Statement) in
resolving the standard comparative issue. 23 The inquiry in most
cases is limited to consideration of certain characteristics of the
applicants, or, in the case of corporate applicants, their principle
owners, rather than the details of their proposed station operation.
The most important considerations are the number of other media
interests owned by the applicants 4 (diversification) and a combina-
tion of their residence and involvement in civic affairs in the com-
munity to be served, their proposed degree of full-time participation
in station management, and their experience in broadcasting
2" See cases cited at notes 135-36 infra.
21 Although neither of the applicants in Ashbacker was an incumbent, the Court's rea-
soning applies where one is incumbent, the Court expressly noting that licensees acquire no
vested interest in their frequencies. 326 U.S. at 331 n.6; cf. Citizens Communication Center
v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1211 n.31, 1212 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 5 P & F Radio Reg. 2d 1901 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Policy
Statement].
The description of the comparative hearing procedure given here is necessarily skele-
tal. For an exhaustive description and critical analysis, see Anthony, Towards Simplicity
and Rationality in Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1, 26-60
(1971) Ihereinafter cited as Anthonyl. For the procedural rules governing the conduct of
hearings, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-.427 (1973).
*2 "Diversification of control of the media of mass communications" is considered a
factor of "primary significance." 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 394-95, 5 P & F
I1ADIO REc-. 2n at 1908. See text at notes 46-57 infra.
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(integration) .25 Evidence is not taken on proposed programming dif-
ferences unless one of the applicants requests that the hearing be
expanded to include that issue and can show that a significant
difference exists.26
The emphasis of the 1965 Policy Statement, which is presently
being applied to participants in comparative renewal hearings even
though by its terms it is not applicable to them,2 is quite signifi-
cant. Even though the Supreme Court has sustained the power of
the Commission to base license allocations on the content of the
applicant's proposed programming, 2 the Commission has appar-
ently abandoned any intent to do so directly in the context of origi-
nal license grants.29 The Commission's reluctance to regulate pro-
gram content probably stems in part from a perception that deter-
mining what programming is in the best interest of the public is not
only an exceptionally difficult task,3 but one that would invariably
trench on first amendment values. More important, the Commis-
sion's various attempts to predict a licensee's content in the past
have all been failures.
The Commission's first attempt to base licensing decisions on
proposed programming, expressed in the 1954 Tampa Tribune
Local residence and broadcasting experience on the part of applicants' owners who are
"integrated" into station management on a full-time basis make up a favorable showing on
this criterion. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 395-96, 5 P & F RADIO REC.. 2D at 1909-
11. See text at notes 42-43, 58-62 infra.
2- Id. at 397-98, 5 P & F RAnio REG. 2D at 1911-12. Other criteria include past broadcast-
ing record of an owner of an interest in the applicant, which is relevant only if unusually good
or poor, id. at 398, 5 P & F RADIo REC. 2o at 1912-13, and "character, which is only set for
hearing if a substantial question is raised. Id. at 399, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2t) at 1913. Other
issues may be added on a showing that the evidence will be of substantial value. Id. at 399-
400, P & F RADo REO. 2n at 1913.
27 Id. at 393 n.1, 5 P & F RADIo REc.. 2n at 1907 n,1.
2' National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943); see Henry v.
FCC, 302 F.2d 191, 193 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962); Johnston Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 175 F.2d 351, 357 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
2' The Commission does exercise authority over the programming content of existing
stations most notably in implementing the "fairness doctrine" which, although it now rests
on an explicit statutory mandate, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1974 Supp.), was largely developed on
the basis of the FCC's general regulatory authority over broadcasters. The constitutionality
of FCC regulation of program content seems to have been settled by the Supreme Court in
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-92 (1969); cf. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1093-96 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). But see Bazelon, FCC
Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 218-37; Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 7-12 (1959).
I" Cf. H. FRIENDi.Y. Tilm FEDERAl. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR BETTER
STANDARDS 54-57 (1962) [hereinafter cited as FRIENDLYI.
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case,3' was a limited one:32 it defined broad categories of program-
ming, such as "public affairs" and "local interest," and, leaving
programming details to the discretion of the individual licensee, it
placed heavy decisional significance on the percentage of broadcast
time applicants proposed to devote to approved program catego-
ries.3 3 Reassured by the Commission's reluctance to deny renewal to
its licensees, 34 even to those which failed to live up to their program-
ming promises, 35 comparative hearing applicants sought to acquire
licenses by inflating their public interest programming proposals.36
In a 1960 report, 37 the Commission reviewed the problems in-
herent in government program regulation and concluded that "the
principle ingredient of the licensee's obligation . . . is the diligent,
positive, and continuing effort by the licensee to discover and fulfill
the tastes, needs, and desires of his community or service area, for
broadcast service." 3 In order to enforce this obligation, the Com-
mission announced that it would no longer set down uniform stan-
dards for "approved" programming but would henceforth require all
applicants and licensees to base their programming on "the ascer-
tainment of community needs," determined by canvasses of their
area and continuing consultation with community leaders .3  The
, The Tribune Co., 19 F.C.C. 100, 9 P & F RADio REC. 719, aff'd on reconsideration, 19
F.C.C. 650 (1954).
3 See Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission en banc Programing Inquiry,
44 F.C.C. 2303, 2306 (1960); Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Pro-
cess: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 10 (1968) (statement by Cox & Johnson,
Comm'rs); Note, Regulation of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HARV. L. REv. 701, 704-06
(1964); CHICAGO COMMENT, supra note 5, at 856-57.
"I See The Tribune Co., 19 F.C.C. 100, 9 P & F RADIO REe,. 719, aff'd on reconsideration,
19 F.C.C. 650 (1954). See also Tampa Times Co., 19 F.C.C. 650, 10 P & F RADIO REG. 77
(1954).
3' See note 66 infra.
31 In a sample of 35 comparative hearing cases between 1952 and 1965, the winners
proposed that an average of 31.5 percent of their broadcast time be dedicated to local live
broadcasting. Their renewal applications revealed that they delivered an average of 11.8
percent. Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 272, 22 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 745, 756
(1971). The FCC was understandably reluctant to disinherit an entire generation of licensees.
See also KORD, Inc., 31 F.C.C. 85, 21 P & F RADIO RE. 781 (1961).
11 See Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 272-73, 22 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 745,
756-57 (1971); Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications
Commission, 63 Gao. L.J. 705, 716 (1975); Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License
Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1969); Schwartz, Comparative Television and the
Chancellor' Foot, 47 GEO. L.J. 655, 659-60 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
37 Report and Statement of Policy Res: Commission en banc Programing Inquiry, 44
F.C.C. 2303 (1960).
3 Id. at 2316.
39 Id.
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following year, in Suburban Broadcasters, Inc.,4" the Commission
applied this principle to deny the application of an unchallenged
applicant which had submitted identical proposals for stations in.
three widely varying service areas without making satisfactory ef-
forts to ascertain the needs of the communities it proposed to serve.
The Suburban approach was clearly a major step by the Com-
mission in the direction of not exerting direct control over the ulti-
mate product of the broadcast industry, programming. Where the
Commission had previously limited itself to assuring that licensees
would promise to air some form of public-interest programming, in
the Suburban case it further limited its role to ensuring that licen-
sees would employ decision-making processes that would presump-
tively result in quality programming responsive to community
needs. Nevertheless, deciding comparative hearings on the basis of
the community ascertainment approach retained the basic flaw of
the earlier approach by relying on the promises of the applicants.4'
Given its inability or unwillingness to scrutinize renewal applica-
tions effectively, the Commission could not monitor an applicant's
continuing efforts to ascertain community needs once it had been
granted a license.
In the 1965 Policy Statement, the Commission took the final
logical step away from attempting to distribute operating licenses
on the basis of proposed programming content by turning to an
examination of the programmers themselves. First, the primary is-
sues under the pre-1965 procedures-programming proposals, com-
munity needs ascertainment and service philosophy-were com-
bined into the single criterion of "proposed program service"; this
consolidated issue is only to be set for hearing if one of the appli-
cants demonstrates the existence of a substantial and material dif-
," 30 F.C.C. 1021, 20 P & F RADIO REG. 951, aff'd sub nom. Henry v. FCC, 302 F.2d 191
(D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 821 (1962).
" The community needs ascertainment issue was developed in the context of setting
minimum qualifications for all applicants rather than deciding between applicants in a
comparative hearing. Although the needs ascertainment issue could be applied in compara-
tive hearings, see. e.g., Burlington Broadcast Co., 34 F.C.C. 1135, 25 P & F RADIO REO. 633
(1963), and received judicial approval as a comparative factor, Great Lakes Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 289 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1960), it did not appear to have much impact on comparative
hearings. Its real significance was that by focusing the Commission's concern for selecting
licensees who would present public-interest programming on applicants' ascertainment
mechanisms at the basic qualification level, it paved the way for the complete abandonment
of the predictive approach to comparative decisions in the 1965 Policy Statement. See text
at notes 60-62 infra; cf. Note, Judicial Review of FCC Program Diversity Regulations, 75
Com.iM. L. RFV. 401, 403-05 (1975).
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ference.4 2 Second, the Commission elevated to decisional promin-
ence certain criteria-namely diversification and integration-that
had been developing over the years but had previously been used
primarily as circumstantial evidence of the likelihood of an appli-
cant implementing its proposals.4 1
Under the 1965 Policy Statement, license allocations are to be
made on the basis of two primary policy goals, the "maximum diffu-
sion of control of the media of mass communications" (diversifica-
tion)44 and "the best practicable service to the public," which, al-
though it includes several other issues, is dominated by "full time
participation in station management by owners," or the integration
issue.45 Integration in turn embraces the subordinate issues of licen-
see experience and local residence. This elevation to decisional sig-
nificance of what previously had been merely evidentiary factors
represented more than the Commission's recognition that it could
not trust applicants' representations; it represented a change in the
philosophy of license allocations away from predictions of program-
ming content and toward structural policies.
Since the inception of the comparative hearing procedure, the
Commission has considered the number of other media interests
held by applicants in a comparative hearing to be a relevant deci-
sional factor46 for two reasons: first, the Commission presumed that
an applicant with no other media interests would be willing to de-
vote more attention to the facility in question;" second, in keeping
12 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 397-98, 5 P & F RADIo RaE.. 2D at 1911-12.
An applicant's record in operating other facilities can only be considered if unusually good
or poor. Id. at 399, 5 P & F RADIo RF.n.. 2D at 1912.
1 Being merely evidentiary factors going to the reliability of predictions, these criteria
in pre-1965 hearings could be overridden by more persuasive evidence of an applicant's
reliability-most commonly the applicant's record in operating another station. See WJR,
The Goodwill Station, 21 F.C.C. 972, 14 P & F RADIO REG. 905 (1956); The Tribune Co., 19
F.C.C. 100, 151-52, 9 P & F RADIo RE.,. 719, 770b-c, a/I'd on reconsideration, 19 F.C.C. 650,
651-52 (1954). In the latter case, the loser argued that by so disregarding its own criteria the
Commission acted arbitrarily, but this argument was rejected by the Court of Appeals.
Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 230 F.2d 204, 205-06 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
1007 (1956).
1965 Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 394, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1908.
1 F.C.C.2d at 395-96, 5 P & F RADIO RaE.. 2o at 1909-10. In accordance with the
elevation of these predictive factors to decisional significance, the separate issue of likelihood
of effectuation of proposals was dropped. Id. at 398, 5 P & F RADIO RE.. 2D at 1912.
,s Bamberger Broadcasting Serv., 11 F.C.C. 211, 222, 3 P & F RADIO REG. 914, 925 (1946).
17 The number of other media interests held by an applicant was relevant to the local
ownership issue. See Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L.
Ray. 479, 483 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Irionl; Schwartz, supra note 36, at 661-62. For a
modern application of this principle, see Nelson Broadcasting Co., 3 F.C.C.2d 84, 7 P & F
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with first amendment notions that democratic government requires
free access to the marketplace of ideas, a policy that maximized the
number and diversity of broadcast licensees was considered desira-
ble per se.48
In 1954, the Commission took a significant step towards viewing
diversification as an independent policy ground for license alloca-
tions. In McClatchy Broadcasting Co. ," the Hearing Examiner had
found one applicant slightly superior on all criteria except diversifi-
cation, on which it was clearly inferior. Finding that this applicant
had given its other stations freedom to express their own opinions,
the Examiner concluded that diversification was not a relevant fac-
tor and awarded the applicant the license.'" The Commission re-
versed, holding that diversification was desirable in and of itself;"
the Court of Appeals affirmed.52 Encouraged by the Court of Ap-
peals under the influence of Judge Bazelon,53 the Commission con-
tinued to move towards establishing diversification as an indepen-
dent ground for license allocation.54 The Commission's adoption of
its first so-called multiple-ownership rules, placing a limit on the
number of licenses that could be held by an individual licensee,55
which were approved by the Supreme Court,5" hastened this process.
In the 1965 Policy Statement, the Commission finally elevated
diversification to the status of a policy goal equal to "best practica-
ble service." In keeping with the McClatchy Broadcasting ap-
proach, diversification represents a structural policy rather than a
manner of predicting service. The Commission, in setting guidelines
regarding diversification, indicated no concern with whether a
multiple-licensee applicant had in fact allowed its other stations
programming autonomy. The factors it will consider are the size of
the applicant's other media interests and the proximity of these
RAmo Ricm. 21) 146 (Rev. Bd. 1966).
" The Commission's development of this theory in the 1950's is summarized and criti-
cized in FRuEND.Y, supra note 30, at 63-70.
19 F.C.C. 343, 9 P & F RADIo Rm.. 1190 (1954).
The Examiner's report is summarized and reprinted in part in McClatchy Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15, 16 & n.2 (1956).
" 19 F.C.C. at 379-81, 9 P & F RADIo RFc.. at 1220i-j.
12 McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See also Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 189 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
5 See Hyde, supra note 5, at 261.
" See Young People's Church of the Air, Inc., 28 F.CC. 617, 623-24, 18 P & F RAMo REM.
947. 948g-h (1960) (R. Lee, Comm'r, dissenting), vacated, 36 F.C.C. 1127, 2 P & F RAnlo REG.
21 527 (1964).
47 C.F.R. §§ 3.35, 3.240, 3.636 (1958).
"' United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
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interests to the broadcast area in question.-7
The structural rationale underlying the 1965 Policy
Statement's treatment of integration is, upon examination, parallel
to that of diversification. Here again the Commission early on devel-
oped a structural policy favoring locally owned and operated
stations per se, regardless of their proposed programming, which it
could call upon in close cases. 8 Similarly, the Commission's preoc-
cupation with predictions of service quality59 obscured the policy's
significance and weakened its force in comparative hearings" before
its elevation to prominence in the 1965 Policy Statement.
The significance of the 1965 Policy Statement is twofold: it
represents the end to the FCC's attempts to determine which com-
peting applicant would provide better programming and it signals
the beginning of an attempt to base licensing decisions on a compar-
ison of certain structural qualities of the applicants. In 1965, the
Commission constructed a model of the type of licensee which it felt
was most likely to program its station in accordance with the public
interest, relying on evidentiary factors which it had previously used
in estimating whether an applicant was likely to carry out its prom-
ises. Because of its inability to determine which licensee would pro-
vide the better programming performance other than through this
model, however, the Commission has established a virtually irre-
buttable presumption that the applicant which most closely con-
forms to that model of diversity and integration will best serve the
public interest.6 This approach makes sense in the cases for which
it was designed-cases where none of the applicants are current
incumbents-because it avoids the problems of predicting which
applicants will provide the best service and bases allocational deci-
sions on policy grounds capable of fairly objective determination.2
5 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 394-95, 5 P & F RADIO REc. 21) at 1908-09.
See Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 715 & n.40 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975).
• See Irion, supra note 47, at 483.
' The three factors which make up the modern integration test-full-time participation
in station management, local residence, and experience-were clearly considered primarily
as evidentiary factors long after diversification had been recognized as an independent struc-
tural policy. Irion, supra note 47, at 483-88.
'" See Judge Friendly's critique of the Commission's misapplication of the local interest
policy. FRIENDLY, supra note 30, at 58-63.
" As of August, 1971, the Commission had not awarded a single preference for proposed
programming in a comparative hearing since the 1965 Policy Statement went into effect.
Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 273, 22 P & F RADio RE . 2D 745, 757 (1971).
11 It should be recognized, however, that the Commission's method of adopting a struc-
tural policy rationale for license allocations without explicitly saying what it was doing or
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However, this late adoption of a policy favoring integrated, diversi-
fied stations in an industry largely composed of corporations with
precisely the opposite qualities raised new questions about the Com-
mission's standards in license renewal challenges.
II. THE COMPARATIVE RENEWAL HEARING
The standard comparative issue-now constituted primarily of
the diversification and integration criteria-was developed to ena-
ble the Commission to make licensing decisions in cases where none
of the applicants are incumbents and thus there is no station in
operation on the frequency in question. When, on the other hand,
one of the candidates in a comparative hearing is seeking to renew
an operating license, some service is being rendered which will be
discontinued if the challenge is successful; different issues therefore
logically arise. Not surprisingly, the comparative renewal hearing
has developed along different lines than the standard comparative
hearing involving nonincumbents.
A. Comparative Renewal Standards Prior to 1965
Prior to 1965, the Commission decided only two comparative
opening up the subject for comment through rulemaking is open to criticism. Indeed, the
Commission has never acknowledged the real basis for the integration criterion as applied
since 1965; some respectable opinion regards the 1965 Policy Statement as nothing more than
the Commission's retreat into reliance on formalistic criteria with no real connection to the
prediction of licensee performance, in order to avoid the problems of probing the sincerity of
applicants. Hyde, supra note 5, at 268-77. If, however, the Commission would acknowledge
the structural basis of its present allocation policies and reexamine them through rulemaking,
such policies would seem to be preferable to the discredited process of predicting perform-
ance. Able observers of the comparative hearing process have criticized the Commission for
failing to develop more objective policy grounds for allocating licenses. Where no such objec-
tive decision is possible, the critics suggest using a lottery, competitive bidding, or some
similar mechanism to make the final decision without the necessity of engaging in predictions
of licensee performance. Star Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(Leventhal, J., dissenting); FRIENDLY, supra note 30, at 70-71; Anthony, supra note 3, at
66-72. The relegation of the issue of predicting licensee performance to the level of basic
qualifications, via the Suburban issue, makes this approach a possibility. See text at notes
40-41 supra. But see text and notes at notes 155-56 infra.
The FCC has maintained that rulemaking is inappropriate in the formulation of stan-
dards for comparative hearings, arguing that application of its various interrelated criteria is
most appropriately an adjudicative task. See Petitions for Rulemaking, in re Policy
Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 24
F.C.C.2d 383 (1970) (reconsideration denied); cf. Brief for Respondents at 40-42, Citizens
Communication Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But see the Commission's
attitude on frequency allocation, note 137 infra, and K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 6.14 (1970 Supp.)
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renewal cases,6 3 in each renewing the license of the incumbent. Fol-
lowing the so-called Hearst doctrine, after the decision in Hearst
Radio, Inc. ," the Commission declared that the challenger was
under a heavier burden of persuasion than an incumbent in an
ordinary comparative hearing. 5 This position was logical when the
basis for license allocation was prediction of program quality. An
incumbent's record of past performance is clearly the best indicator
of its future performance, and in light of the uncertainty of predict-
ing performance by untried applicants under the Tampa Tribune
approach, it was inevitable that challengers would face an almost
insuperable burden of persuasion.66
The change in allocation bases signalled by the 1965 Policy
Statement raised entirely new issues. Incumbents in comparative
renewal hearings have no inherent advantages under the
Statement's structural system as they have under a predictive sys-
" Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp. (WTHI-TV), 35 F.C.C. 677, 1 P & F RADIO REG.
2n 573 (1963); Hearst Radio, Inc., 15 F.C.C. 1149, 6 P & F RADIO REc. 994, aff'd on
reconsideration, 16 F.C.C. 141, 6 P & F RADIO REc. 1036d (1951). A handful of other cases
have involved comparative hearings in which one applicant was seeking renewal of a four-
month temporary license which the Commission had granted specifically to encourage other
applicants. See Community Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 363 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1966); South
Fla. Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
' 15 F.C.C. 1149, 6 P & F RADIO REr.. 994, aff'd on reconsideration, 16 F.C.C. 141, 6 P &
F RAnto REc,. 1036d (1951).
11 See note 43 supra. The first comparative renewal case, Hearst, was contemporaneous
with Tampa Tribune and WJR and, like them, is based heavily on the superior basis for
prediction of future service found in the examination of an applicant's record of operation.
15 F.C.C. at 1175-76, 6 P & F RADIO R~c.. at 1026-27. In Wabash Valley, the FCC relied on
the Hearst precedent to reject the challenger's argument that consideration should be limited
to the records of the AM stations owned by both applicants, since each had a record to be
compared on. Declaring the incumbent's record on the frequency in question to be "the most
reliable gage as to what can be expected. . . in the future", the Commission then discounted
the challenger's "commendable" record as an AM operator because it was "compiled in a
different medium and city than the ones here involved . 35 F.C.C. at 678-79, 1 P & F
RA io REG. 2n at 576-77.
"' The Commission has always been reluctant to deny renewal for any reason and has
often been accused of identifying too closely with powerful elements of the broadcast industry.
See. e.g., Geller, A Modest Proposal for Modest Reform of the Federal Communications
Commission, 63 GEo. L.J. 705, 716 (1975). Prior to 1969, only 74 renewal applications were
denied. Hearings on S. 2004 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 38 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; see
Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study,
14 F.C.C.2d 1 (1968) (statement by Cox & Johnson, Comm'rs); Comment, Media Reform
Through Comparative License Renewal Procedures-The Citizens Case, 57 IOWA L. REV. 912,
918-21 (1972). The Commission's reluctance to deny renewal found support in Court of Ap-
peals decisions stressing the "compelling reasons" needed to divest a broadcaster of its li-
cense. Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. FCC, 105 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Chicago Fed'n of
Labor v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 41 F.2d 422 (D.C. Cir. 1930). See also WOKO, Inc. v. FCC,
153 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
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tem. Indeed, they are usually at a disadvantage. Most comparative
renewal hearings involve an application filed by residents of the
service area involved with no other media interests, attempting to
displace a pre-1965 licensee owned by a large broadcasting corpora-
tion or by some other local media, such as a newspaper."7 Yet in
order to apply its comparative criteria in such a situation, the Com-
mission must first determine as a matter of policy that the diversifi-
cation and integration policies should be given retroactive effect; in
other words, that the public interest requires restructuring the pre-
1965 part of the broadcast industry to conform to the Commission's
ideal structural model. In noncomparative cases the Commission
has been reluctant to give its structural policies such retroactive
effect.88
In determining whether to restructure the pre-1965 industry,
the Commission faces different problems in unopposed renewal
hearings and comparative renewal hearings. Refusing renewal to a
licensee in a noncomparative situation on the basis of the structural
policies would require a judgment that the furthering of those poli-
cies is more important than the continued provision of the licensee's
" See 40 GEO. WASH. L. RFV. 571, 578-79 (1972); cf. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 25-26,
15 P & F RADIO REGc. 21 411, 435-36 (1969) (R. Lee, Comm'r, dissenting).
" Thus, although the Commission has established rules placing an absolute limit on the
number of licenses one licensee can hold, in 1970 it decided it would not apply these rules to
existing multiple licensees pending further rulemaking directed specifically to the question
of divestiture. First Report and Order, in re Amendment of Commission Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership, 22 F.C.C.2d 306, 322-23, 18 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 1735, 1755-56 (1970);
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in re Amendment of Commission Rules Relating to
Multiple Ownership, 22 F.C.C.2d 339 (1970). This required five years to complete, and re-
sulted in the Commission declining to order divestiture based solely on the number of licenses
held by a single licensee, limiting divestiture to situations where one licensee controls vir-
tually all of the media in a service area. Second Report and Order, in re Amendment of
Commission Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 32 P & F RADIO REC.
2n 954 (1975).
This approach is also reflected in several cases, decided before 1975 and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, in which the Commission refused to entertain petitions to deny renewal
filed by interested non-applicants under 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1970). The petitions alleged that
the licensees in question had consolidated an undue concentration of media control, but were
considered deficient because they failed to allege specific abuses. Columbus Broadcasting
Coalition v. FCC, 505 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
The Commission has not had occasion to address the restructuring issues involved in the
application of the integration criterion to existing stations, as it continues to regard integra-
tion as evidentiary of predicted service and hence irrelevant in the uncontested renewal cases.
See text at notes 131-33 supra. One commentator, referring primarily to integration, has
noted that "Commission concern for the structure of the communications industry has been
virtually ignored in the traditional renewal procedure." CHICAGO COMMENT, supra note 5, at
868.
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broadcasting services. In the comparative renewal hearing, on the
other hand, the question is who will provide broadcasting service,
not whether it will be provided. In order to justify not applying the
standards of the 1965 Policy Statement in this situation, the Com-
mission would have to assert some policy grounds for preferring
incumbents. Although such a policy could perhaps be found where
the incumbent has a record of providing exceptional service, un-
likely to be matched by the challenging applicant, it is more diffi-
cult to justify refusing to apply the structural policies in a compara-
tive renewal hearing where the licensee has an average operating
record substantially in accord with prevailing industry norms. In
such a case a challenger can be expected to provide service roughly
equivalent to that of the incumbent." Thus by adopting an alloca-
tional scheme which did not rely on proposed programming quality
and adopting criteria which virtually invited challenge to estab-
lished industry giants, the Commission paved the way for the cur-
rent comparative renewal controversy.
B. The WHDH Case and the 1970 Policy Statement
In 1969 the Commission startled the broadcast industry when,
in its first post-1965 comparative renewal case, it appeared to
abandon the Hearst doctrine. In WHDH, Inc.70 the Commission re-
fused to renew the license of a Boston television station owned by a
newspaper that also operated two radio stations, granting the li-
cense instead to a challenger with no other media interests. The
Commission found that the incumbent's broadcasting record was
only average and declared that as a result the incumbent was not
entitled to preferential treatment in the hearing. Applying the 1965
Policy Statement standards, even though the Statement was by its
own terms limited to non-renewal situations,71 the Commission
found the challenger to be superior on both diversification and inte-
gration grounds and thus deserving of the license.72
In response to intense criticism generated by a fear that the
Commission's new doctrine would jeopardize established broadcast-
" This conclusion is supported by the fact that an applicant qualified under the
Suburban test has demonstrated an ability to provide the minimum level of community-
oriented programming required of all applicants. See text at note 40 supra.
7D WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 1, 15 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 411 (1969), aff'd sub nom. Greater
Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
71 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 393 n.1, 5 P & F RADio REG. 2D at 1907 n.1.
72 16 F.C.C.2d at 7-10, 15 P & F RADM REG. 2D at 421-24 (1969).
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ers' substantial investments,'3 the FCC backed away from WHDH,
subsequently declaring that its decision in that case was sui generis
because WHDH had been operating under a four-month temporary
license, and hence was not a true incumbent licensee. 4 This recan-
tation did not appease the critics, however, and in 1970 the Com-
mission, reacting to pending legislation75 that would have abolished
the comparative renewal proceeding altogether, issued its Policy
Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular
Renewal Applicants" (1970 Policy Statement).
The 1970 Policy Statement was the Commission's first attempt
to set forth explicitly the policies governing comparative renewal
hearings. The statement provided that hearings would focus at first
solely on the record of the incumbent. Competing applicants could
participate, but their participation would be limited to pointing out
weaknesses in the incumbent's record.77 If found to have been "sub-
stantially attuned to meeting the needs and interest of its area ' 7 8
throughout the previous license term, the incumbent would be
granted renewal without a comparative inquiry; otherwise, all appli-
cants would be compared under the 1965 Policy Statement criteria.
To justify giving incumbents such an advantage, the Commis-
sion asserted that the public interest in stability in the-broadcast
industry required that those broadcasters who provided substantial
service be assured of renewal. In support of this position, the Com-
mission pointed out the difficulty of predicting the calibre of per-
formance of an untried applicant and concluded that the public
might not benefit from replacing a competent incumbent with an
"1 The leading article in the attack on WHDH was Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broad-
casting License Renewals, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1693 (1969), which characterized the decision as
a "desperate and spasmodic lurch toward 'the left' . . . ." Id. at 1700. For the industry's
views on WHDH, see Three Billion Dollars in Stations Down the Drain? BROADCASTING, Feb.
3, 1969, at 19.
"1 WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d 856, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 185 (1969) (reconsideration
denied). As the station had been operating on a four-month temporary license because of its
former president's alleged attempts to improperly influence the Commission chairman, the
Commission contended that it was similar to other comparative hearings involving incum-
bents not considered "true renewal candidates." See cases cited at note 63 supra. The deci-
sion was affirmed on this ground. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444, F.2d 841,
853-59 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). This factor in the case leads to the con-
clusion that perhaps the furor over WHDH was caused not so much by the decison as by
the Commission's broad language in its first opinion. See text at note 72 supra.
I See generally Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"--The Aftermath of WHDH in FCC
License Renewal Policy, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1014 (1970).
7- 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18 P & F RADio REG. 2D 1901 (1970).
" Id. at 428, 18 P & F RADIo REC,. 2D at 1908.
Id. at 425, 18 P & F RADio REC.. 2D at 1904-05.
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unknown product." The Commission also drew on its court-
approved cautionary approach to applying structural policies retro-
actively and stated that stability required that rulemaking pro-
ceedings be engaged in before licensees were divested of their licen-
ses on the basis of diversification.8'
At the same time, the Commission instituted rulemaking pro-
ceedings82 to define the meaning of "substantial service" for VHF
television stations. The Commission indicated that substantial
service should be defined in terms of percentages of air time that
stations should devote to various categories of public interest pro-
gramming;8 3 industry-wide norms would be established that any
ordinary licensee should be able to meet.84
If this concept of substantial service is read together with the
1970 Policy Statement, the Commission's composite 1970 position
is that the public interest in stability requires that any station
which meets the average level of service for the industry be insu-
lated against replacement in a comparative renewal proceeding. To
some extent this position reflects the Commission's earlier and un-
successful attempts to predict programming performance; in this
sense it is anachronistic. However, the 1970 Policy Statement also
reflects to an extent the Commission's more modern concern with
the structure of the industry.
7 Id. at 429, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1909.
"' See note 68 supra.
x Id. at 427, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1907.
82 Notice of Inquiry, in re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal
Candidate, Stemming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 27 F.C.C.2d 580, 53 P & F
RA io REG. CURRENT SERV. 429 (1971). This proceeding apparently has not been concluded.
See Third Further Notice of Inquiry, 43 F.C.C.2d 1043, P & F RADIO REG. CURRENT SERV. 442h
(1973).
11 The Commission tentatively proposed that all stations devote 10-15 percent of their
broadcast time to local programming, that independent stations devote 5 percent of their time
to news and network affiliates 8-10 percent, and that all stations devote 3-5 percent to public
affairs programming. Notice of Inquiry, 27 F.C.C.2d 580, 581, 53 P & F RADIO REG. CURRENT
SERV. 429, 431 (1971).
11 The Commission's approach is to set its substantial service standard within the reach
of the average station. See Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving
Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 426-27, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1901, 1904
(1970); cf. RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 149, 228, 16 P & F RADio REG. 2D 1181, 1271
(Hearing Examiner 1969) (initial decision). In fact, the statistics the Commission published
with its Third Further Notice of Inquiry indicate that its proposed standards have already
been met by the bulk of the industry, 43 F.C.C.2d at 1045-68, 53 P & F RADIO REG. CURRENT
SERV. 442j-gg. It may be speculated that this is an example of what has been called
"regulation by raised eyebrow," i.e., the mere announcement that the Commission considered
the percentages suggested in the Notice of Inquiry "substantial" was enough to bring the
industry, solicitous of its licenses, into line.
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The 1970 Policy Statement was an admirable, though mis-
guided," attempt by the Commission to reconcile the competing
structural policies of encouraging stability and promoting a
diversified-integrated broadcasting industry. In the typical compar-
ative renewal situation, the Commission is faced with two appli-
cants, one of which would serve the policy of stability, the other the
policy of diversity-integration. Since the Commission has found it
impossible to predict which applicant will provide better service,
there is no common ground on which to compare the two. The Com-
mission must decide, as a matter of policy, which interest is more
compelling in such situations-stability or integration-
diversification. The 1970 Policy Statement, for all its flaws, was an
attempt to do just that.
C. The Citizens Case
The 1970 Policy Statement was short-lived, however. In Citi-
zens Communication Center v. FCC,,6 the Court of Appeals vacated
the Policy Statement in its entirety, before it could be applied in
any hearing.87 The petitioners, two nonprofit organizations inter-
ested in "improving" the media and two parties to pending hear-
ings,8 challenged the 1970 Policy Statement on the grounds that it
abridged the challenger's statutory right to a hearing as interpreted
in the Ashbacker case,89 and that it had been promulgated in disre-
gard of the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure
Act."' Without reaching the procedural question,9' the court noted
that it was quite plain that the truncated hearing procedure of the
1970 Policy Statement, in which a license renewal could be granted
without allowing challengers a hearing on the merits of their own
The Commission's definition of stability is criticized in text at notes 146-49 infra.
447 F.2d at 1214.
" Like WHDH, Citizens generated the introduction of legislation that would have
substantially cut back on, or eliminated entirely, the comparative renewal procedure. For a
legislative history, see Hyde, supra note 6, at 254 n.12. See generally FCC License Renewal
Reform: Two Comments on Recent Legislative Proposals, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 67 (1973).
447 F.2d at 1202 n.2.
' See text and notes at notes 13-15 supra.
5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
" The court declined to decide Citizens on the basis of the Commission's failure to em-
ploy notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings under § 553 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 553
(1970), but it termed the Commission's arguments that such a proceeding was unnecessary
"remarkable." 447 F.2d 1204 n.5. Nevertheless, the court again refused to order the Commis-
sion to engage in rulemaking to determine the meaning of "superior service" when the case
came before it again two years later. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 463 F.2d 822
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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applications, was the same sort of proceeding condemned in
Ashbacker as an "empty thing."9
The Citizens case raises difficult problems of interpretation. It
could be maintained that Citizens requires only that the
Commission give challengers a chance to present the merits of their
applications before making a decision, but that the Commission can
still apply whatever substantive grounds for decision it chooses. 3
Such a reading, however, would debase the meaning of Ashbacker,
in which case the Commission had been willing to grant the unsuc-
cessful applicant a full, though not effective, hearing." Citizens
must protect more than the right to speak words which the Commis-
sion is free to ignore: little would be served by requiring the Com-
mission to hear the challenger's proposals if, as a matter of policy,
the Commission intends to renew the incumbent's license regardless
of the challenger's merit. But, on the other hand, the Citizens court
did not intend to require the Commission to hold a full comparative
hearing every time a challenger filed an application; the court recog-
nized that, under Storer,95 the Commission need not give an unqual-
ified applicant a hearing. Evidently, the court was suggesting that
the Commission may not decide a comparative renewal hearing
solely on the basis of the incumbent's record, that a challenger does
not become unqualified because the incumbent has an average
record.
Although the court did not want to usurp the Commission's
function of setting standards, it was nonetheless aware that it
should not vacate the 1970 Policy Statement without giving the
Commission some guidance regarding permissible standards.
Implying that Johnston Broadcasting97 requires the Commission to
weigh all relevant differences between the incumbent and the chal-
lengers in a comparative renewal hearing, the court stated that the
Commission could place some, though evidently not controlling
weight on the quality of the incumbent's operating record in resolv-
ing the comparative issue. A "superior record," the court said,
,2 447 F.2d at 1211. See text at note 14 supra.
The Citizens court itself at one point claimed that the issue in the case involved the
procedures, not the standards, employed by the Commission in comparative renewal hear-
ings. 447 F.2d at 1212 n.34.
'1 The court recognized that the situation in Ashbacker was not precisely parallel, as in
that case the FCC had given the unsuccessful applicant a hearing on its merits. 447 F.2d at
1211.
,' See text and notes at notes 16-21 supra.
,6 447 F.2d at 1212 n.34.
" 447 F.2d at 1212-13. See text and note at note 18 supra.
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should be a "plus of major significance" and "[i]nsubstantial per-
formance should preclude renewal." 8 This formulation is analogous
to the Commission's practice of granting preferences and demerits 9
The FCC, however, has misinterpreted the court's "plus of
major significance" language, using it as a synonym for the invalid
1970 Policy Statement's "substantial service" test.'0 The court
contemplated that an incumbent would receive much credit in a
comparative renewal hearing for having a superior record-credit
that could prove decisive in a given case-but it did not contem-
plate that a strong record would obviate the need for a comparative
inquiry.'"'
Apart from its remarks concerning the weight to be given an
incumbent's record, the Citizens court did not give the Commission
any more direct guidance regarding permissible standards. The
court did imply that the Commission would be deficient if it only
applied the standards from the 1965 Policy Statement because, as
the court indicated, the incumbent's record is necessarily at issue
in the comparative renewal hearing. However, the court did not
indicate its opinion as to whether the structural policies could be
applied at all in comparative renewal hearings and, assuming they
could, whether the Commission can attempt to strike a balance
between stability and restructuring. In light of the court's failure to
probe the substance of the 1970 Policy Statement, it is unfortunate
that it did not remand the Statement to the Commission for recon-
sideration and rulemaking,1 2 because after Citizens the Commis-
sion was left without a policy for comparative renewal hearings.
' 447 F.2d at 1213.
" See note 23 supra.
" A.H. Belo Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 1131, 1133, 27 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 889, 892 (1973), on
reconsideration, 47 F.C.C.2d 540, 30 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 975 (1974); Further Notice of
Inquiry, in re Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Applicant, Stem-
ming from the Comparative Hearing Process, 31 F.C.C.2d 443, 444-45, 43 P & F RADIO REG.
CURRENT SERV. 442, 442a-b (1971); Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263, 268-69, 22
P & F RADio REG. 2D 745, 752-53 (1971); see Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process in
Television: Problems and Suggested Solutions, 61 VA. L. RMv 471, 487 (1975).
The court has declined to interfere in the Commission's process of defining "substantial
service," stating that its suggested standards were not part of its mandate in the first Citizens
opinion. Citizens Communication Center v. FCC, 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972). For a discus-
sion of the distinction between the court's and the Commission's approaches to this question,
see note 149 infra.
"' The tenuousness of the distinction between a "plus of major significance" and a
determinative test is emphasized by the fact that another panel of the Court of Appeals seems
to have read Citizens to require a comparative hearing only when the incumbent's record fails
the "superior service" test. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 703 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 271 (1975).
1' The subject matter of the 1970 Policy Statement, profoundly affecting substantial
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D. The Commission's Implementation of Citizens: RKO General
The court's intention in striking down the 1970 Policy
Statement in Citizens was to ensure that challengers would receive
a fair hearing in a comparative renewal proceeding. In doing so, the
court halted the Commission's progress towards identifying and ar-
ticulating the unique policy problems presented by comparative
renewal hearings without giving the Commission substantial guid-
ance regarding the direction its policy should take. As a result of
Citizens, the Commission is required to compare all qualified appli-
cants in a comparative hearing on the basis of all the relevant cri-
teria,103 but this requirement does not ensure that the challenger will
receive a fair hearing. Experience shows that the Commission's lati-
tude in making findings is so great'"4 and its discretion over the
weight accorded to the criteria so broad that the Commission's deci-
sions will invariably be affirmed if it at least pays lip service to all
of the relevant criteria. 10 5 Thus the result of Citizens has not been
interests of hundreds of broadcasters as well as the basic structure of the broadcast industry,
is clearly appropriate for rulemaking, and would have given the court a record on which to
judge whether too much consideration was given to the interests of incumbents. The leading
commentator on rulemaking procedures has pointed out that: "When more than a handful
of parties are affected, creation of new law through ... administrative rule making is much
more desirable than creation of new law through either judicial decision or administrative
adjudication." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1970 Supp.). Prof.
Davis has identified six specific grounds for preferring rulemaking procedures in cases such
as this: (1) all interested parties are systematically notified; (2) tentative rules are available
for study and comment before the decision is made; (3) by providing for wider participation
by interested parties, rulemaking is more democratic than adjudication; (4) agencies are free
to consult informally with helpful sources; (5) retroactive changes in the law are minimized;
and (6) it provides a better basis for oversight by Congressional committees. Id. § 6.15, at
284; cf. note 62 supra.
"I For a detailed analysis and critique of the Commission's criteria, see Anthony, supra
note 23, at 26-60.
01 FRIENDLY, supra note 30, at 54, 59-60; Anthony, supra note 23, at 39-45; see text and
notes at notes 106-26 infra.
"05 See, e.g., Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 35 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 47 (D.C. Cir.
Sept. 24, 1975); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969), aff'd on subsequent
appeal, 459 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); Carroll Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Granik v. FCC, 234 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1956);
Democrat Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1952). In his dissent in Fidelity
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 705 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S.
Nov. 4, 1975), Judge Bazelon stated:
In an earlier day, this court tended to affirm comparative licensing decisions with only
the most limited inquiry into the process of decision-making. If the FCC denominated
the factors operative in its decisions with some reasonable clarity, this court would not
intervene .... In recent years this court has, it appeared to me, moved away from this
posture into a more demanding stance ....
Id. at 705. Although the first part of this statement is undoubtedly true, the last seems wishful
thinking. In support of the latter proposition, Judge Bazelon cited only three cases; none of
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to stop the Commission from applying the 1970 Policy Statement,
but merely to stop it from admitting it is doing so. An examination
of Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC,'0 1 in which the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Commission's decision in RKO General, Inc.,'10 the
first comparative renewal hearing to reach the court since Citizens,
will show this to be the case.
In Fidelity, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's
decision to renew the broadcast license of RKO General, Inc., whose
subsidiary, KHJ-TV, operated the channel in question, and to reject
the application of Fidelity Television, a locally-owned corporation.
The court's seemingly unexceptionable holding was that the FCC,
faced with a choice between two essentially equally qualified appli-
cants for the same frequency, is justified in awarding the license to
the incumbent in order to assure reasonable stability in the broad-
cast industry.' 8 However, the tortuous path followed by the Com-
mission in determining that the two applicants were equal,' 9 and
the Court of Appeals' uncritical approval of that conclusion, evoked
sharp dissents in both bodies. The dissenters contended that the
Commission, although nominally following Citizens, used its broad
discretion in making comparisong effectively to eviscerate Fidelity's
right to a fair hearing.''0
The first issue raised in the comparative hearing in RKO
which truly support his position: WAIT Radio v. FCC, supra, in which the Commission
originally did not hold a hearing at all and reached the same conclusion in the hearing held
on remand, which was affirmed; Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971), discussed in note 74 supra; and Judge Leventhal's
dissenting opinion in Star Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
In fact, where the Commission has at least discussed the factors on which it relies, the
Court of Appeals, following the lead of early Supreme Court opinions stressing the broad
authority of the FCC, usually affirms after reciting the litany that the Commission has wide
discretion in weighing comparative factors. See, e.g., FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting Co., 309
U.S. 134 (1939); Star Television, Inc. v. FCC, 416 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1969); McClatchy
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Pinellas Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
230 F.2d 2042 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 (1956). Professor Davis has pointed out
that one of the primary reasons courts avoid reviewing and reversing agency decisions is a
"very common judicial psychology" that judges prefer not to try to review questions, such as
the selection of broadcasters, that require expert technical knowledge. K. DAvls, ADMINISTRA-
TIvE LAW TREATISE § 28.16, at 976 (1970 Supp.).
1- 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3263 (U.S. Nov. 4, 1975).
,07 44 F.C.C.2d 123, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1501 (1973).
'' 515 F.2d at 702, 704.
,u See text at notes 111-24 infra.
,, Although the Court of Appeals panel which heard the case voted unanimously to
affirm, Judge Bazelon wrote a lengthy opinion stating his reasons for voting for hearing en
banc. 515 F.2d at 705. Commissioners Johnson and H. Lee dissented to the Commission's
decision in separate opinions. 44 F.C.C.2d at 142, 28 P & F RADIo REG. 2D at 1522.
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General related to the applicants' basic qualifications. General Tire
and Rubber Co., the parent corporation of RKO, had recently been
charged in an antitrust action brought by the Justice Department
with engaging in reciprocal dealing in, among other things, televi-
sion advertising time. Although the hearing officer specifically
found that the licensee had participated in these activities, the
Commission minimized the significance of this deficiency by noting
that the illegality of these dealings had not been clear when commit-
ted."' The Commission was not, however, so charitable in evaluat-
ing Fidelity's business practices. Fidelity was charged with failing
to amend its application to reflect that one of its stockholders had
acquired a small interest in some suburban newspapers. The Com-
mission refused to reopen the record to take evidence on this conten-
tion, but nevertheless made use of it in the subsequent weighing of
Fidelity's comparative strengths."'2 In short, the Commission mini-
mized the seriousness of KHJ's anticompetitive behavior and max-
imized that of Fidelity."3
The Commission then turned to KHJ's broadcast record, find-
ing it mixed but average on balance. The Commission emphasized
that KHJ had accurately reported'its programming and had sub-
stantially implemented the proposals it had made in its original
application, proposals which were at that time considered to be in
accordance with the public interest."' KHJ was precisely the kind
of operator the Commission is loathe to disturb and replace with an
untested applicant-an average but honest performer.
Fidelity's case may well have been lost at this point. But under
Citizens, the Commission was required to conduct a full compara-
tive hearing. Fidelity was clearly superior to KHJ on the compara-
44 F.C.C.2d at 128-30, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1509-11.
44 F.C.C.2d at 177-78, 16 P & F RADio REG. 2D at 1214.
" The Hearing Examiner found a clear pattern of reciprocal dealing and concluded that
it was contrary to the public service purposes for which licenses are issued, caused unfair
competition to independent broadcasters, resulted in overcommercialization of KHJ's air
time, and reduced incentives for good programming. 44 F.C.C.2d at 221-23, 16 P & F RADIO
REG. 2D at 1264-66. The Commission discussed none of these points. Two of the Commission-'
ers, in dissent, thought that KHJ should have been disqualified as a licensee entirely for this
behavior. 44 F.C.C.2d at 141, 144, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1521, 1525.
"1 44 F.C.C.2d at 130-32, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1513-15. The opinion at this point
illustrates the inherent advantage of having a record to run on. The FCC, like the Hearing
Examiner, listed the various public interest programs KHJ had aired, but where the Exam-
iner had gone on to weigh those programs against the rest of KHJ's broadcast record, 44
F.C.C.2d at 220-21, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1262-64, the Commission was content to let
the list of the station's accomplishments determine the issue, remarking that the station
could not be expected to please everyone. 44 F.C.C.2d at 131-33, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at
1513-14.
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tive structural criteria of integration and diversification. RKO's
owner, General Tire and Rubber Co., has its headquarters in New
York and Ohio; at the time of the hearing it held 18 licenses in
addition to KHJ, as well as other media interests."' Fidelity was
owned entirely by local residents, none of whom had any significant
other media interests. Two of its stockholders, owning together 22.6
percent of its stock, proposed to work full-time in the station."' The
Commission nevertheless managed to find the two applicants essen-
tially equally qualified.
The Commission relied on the earlier character issue to narrow
the gap between the applicants on the diversification issue. It re-
duced Fidelity's advantage because one of its stockholders had ac-
quired another media interest, despite the lack of evidence on the
point"' and though Fidelity claimed that the interest in question
was that of a minor stockholder in a weekly advertising "shopper."' 18
KHJ's disadvantage, on the other hand, was reduced because the
Commission found that RKO General had not interfered with the
autonomy of the station management; the reciprocal dealing was
ignored."' The Commission stated further that any diversification
advantage enjoyed by Fidelity would not be controlling because
there were numerous other broadcast facilities in the area and be-
cause the Commission opposed restructuring the broadcast industry
through comparative renewal hearings.120 This argument could po-
tentially undermine the Citizens decision; if the Commission can
declare that any comparative criterion is irrelevant in a comparative
renewal hearing, eventually it could be left with only the adequacy
of the incumbent's record as a basis for decision, in direct conflict
with Citizens.
The final issue was the best practicable service criterion, which
in this case only involved integration. The Commission found that
RKO had achieved the functional equivalent of integration by giv-
ing the station management autonomy in programming and requir-
ing the managers to participate in local civic affairs.121 It reached
,, 44 F.C.C.2d at 153-54, 16 P & F RADIo REG. 2D at 1186-87.
li Id. at 188-89, 16 P & F RADMO REG. 2D at 1228-29. The Hearing Examiner gave Fidelity
a demerit on integration, evidently not believing its proposal. The Commission ignored the
Examiner's finding on this point, but the Court of Appeals reinstated the Examiner's finding
as its ground for affirming the Commission's decision. 515 F.2d at 700, 701.
II 44 F.C.C.2d at 133-34, 28 P & F RADio REG. 2D at 1514-15.
"' 447 F.2d at 701 n.42. The court regarded the use of the interest to downgrade Fidelity's
diversification preference as "harmless error."
"1 44 F.C.C.2d at 133-34, 28 P & F RADIo REG. 2D at 1514-15; see note 113 supra.
120 Id.
"I1 Id. at 136, 28 P & F RADMO REG. 2D at 1517.
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this conclusion even though the Hearing Examiner had found that
the station had repeatedly scheduled excessively violent films de-
spite widespread community protest, the very type of insensitivity
to community opinion the integration criterion should act to elimi-
nate.' 2 Even assuming its finding to be correct, however, the Com-
mission was, as with the diversification issue, refusing to compare
the applicants on the grounds that its comparative criteria do not
justify displacing an incumbent in RKO's position. In then assess-
ing Fidelity's strength on the integration issue, the Commission
again used the issue it had declined to order evidence taken on. It
asserted that Fidelity's failure to make timely notification of
changes in its media interests gave rise to the suspicion that its
integration proposals were not made in good faith, and consequently
reduced its advantage. Thus, no preference was awarded on the
integration criterion,'2 3 causing Judge Bazelon to characterize the
hearing as bearing "the stench of procedural bias.' ' '24
In sum, the central flaw in RKO General is that the Commis-
sion simply refused to compare the applicants at all. The Commis-
sion claimed to base its decision on the policy preference for incum-
bents over challengers when no substantial difference appears be-
tween them.'2 ' It did so, however, only after dismissing as inapplica-
ble all of the criteria it normally uses to measure the differences
between applicants because one applicant was a renewal candidate
with an acceptable record of service. Had the Commission, without
taking any evidence on Fidelity's application, examined RKO's rec-
ord and determined that it was within the bounds of average per-
formance, announced that the diversification criterion was not rele-
vant because KHJ was autonomous in its programming and in a
diverse broadcasting market, and that integration was not relevant
because KHJ's management was the functional equivalent of local
owner-operators, and thereupon renewed RKO's license, it would
clearly have violated Citizens. Instead, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed when it took the same three findings, interspersed them
'2 Id. at 177-88, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1214-28. The Examiner found that a "respect-
able and substantial body of community opinion . . .voiced disapproval .. .[and their]
disapproval fell on deaf ears. The protests. . . appear to have been met only by a gratuitous
exhibition of arrogance . . . .The licensee attitude thus reflected does not measure up to
that sense of licensee responsibility to the public the Commission has a right to expect from
those whom it franchises." Id. at 221, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1263. See also note 113 supra.
" 44 F.C.C.2d at 135-36, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1516-17.
515 F.2d at 717 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
' 44 F.C.C.2d at 137, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2D at 1518-19. This was the main point on
which the court affirmed. 515 F.2d at 704-05.
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through a hearing in which it noted Fidelity's advantages, deni-
grated them through the use of charges on which it had not taken
evidence, and refused to give them any decisional significance. If
ever a hearing deserved the appellation "an empty thing," it was
surely that afforded Fidelity.2 '
III. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE RENEWAL HEARINGS
Given the Commission's unwillingness or inability to apply the
standard comparative issue properly to incumbents with acceptable
broadcasting records, it is tempting to agree with those who argue
that the procedure should not be employed at all, or should be
limited to the situation in which the challenger can demonstrate a
need for a change due to misconduct on the part of the incumbent. 27
Proponents of the comparative renewal process have advanced two
arguments 2 1 in support of it: first, the threat of potential chal-
lengers encourages licensees to strive to render the best possible
service; 29 second, it provides a mechanism whereby social
groups-particularly racial minorities-previously excluded from
ownership of stations can gain access to the airwaves. 3 1 In addition,
we have seen that the 1965 Policy Statement allocates licenses on
the basis of policies regarding the structure of the industry; presum-
ably if these policies are important enough to justify basing all
original license allocations on them in comparative cases, there is
12' For a more detailed critique of Fidelity and RKO, see Judge Bazelon's dissent, 515
F.2d at 705-21
"I Insofar as the comparative renewal procedure encourages applicants to become pri-
vate attorneys general and uncover misconduct by licensees that has escaped the notice of
the Commission, the procedure serves a valuable function, particularly since groups seeking
to challenge a license renewal without the incentive of seeking the license themselves face
high costs and unsympathetic Commission procedures. See Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Further, the presence of
another qualified applicant ready and willing to provide service to an area can encourage the
Commission to deny renewal to a licensee whose performance, although substandard, is not
egregious enough to warrant the drastic step of decreasing the amount of service available to
an area by a flat denial of renewal. See Star Stations of Indiana, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 114, 26 P
& F RADIO REG. 2D 1101 (Admin. Law Judge 1973), rev'd in part, 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 32 P & F
RADIO REe.. 2D 1137 (1975).
"I The Citizens court invoked both these arguments in dicta. 447 F.2d at 1206, 1213 n.36,
1214.
121 Thus the supporters of the comparative renewal procedure have relied primarily on
the failure of the FCC to adequately review licensee performance at renewal. See generally
Comment, Media Reform Through Comparative License Renewal Procedures: The Citizens
Case, 57 IOWA L. REv. 912 (1972); CHICAGO COMMENT, supra note 5; Comment, The Aftermath
of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of Mediocrity? 118 U. PA. L. REv. 368
(1970).
'" Hearings, supra note 66, at 610-13.
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some public interest in bringing nonconforming parts of the indus-
try into line with them.
An examination of these arguments will show, however, that
the interests stressed would not be served by the application of the
Commission's ordinary comparative criteria to all comparative re-
newal situations. The first argument, the so-called "competitive
spur" theory, is based on a misunderstanding of the 1965 Policy
Statement. Incumbents can only "compete" with challengers if the
Commission attempts to predict whether the incumbent or the chal-
lenger would provide better service, which it does not and probably
cannot do. The only competition that would be spurred by an appli-
cation of the 1965 Policy Statement to comparative renewal hear-
ings would be competition to design a corporate structure which fits
the FCC's model; many incumbents locked into a corporate struc-
ture which can be "improved" only with great difficulty would be
seriously disadvantaged. The comparative renewal process can only
provide a programming spur to incumbents if the Commission
threatens to compare incumbents with challengers on the basis of
the 1965 Policy Statement, and then exempts those incumbents
which achieve a certain level of performance-the approach struck
down in Citizens when based on average performance.
The 1965 Policy Statement is likewise a poor tool to promote
minority access to the airwaves simply because its sweep is too wide.
Minority access is a special issue raising many difficult policy ques-
tions; it will not be raised in all cases and the 1965 Policy Statement
was not designed to deal with it. And finally, although there may
be some public interest in retroactive application of the diversifica-
tion-integration policies, the 1965 Policy Statement itself provides
no means for determining the threshold question of whether its cri-
teria should be applied retroactively at all-that is a policy question
which the Commission must make separately, weighing the public
interest in diversification-integration against that in stability.
None of the unique issues raised by a comparative renewal
hearing are really "comparative" at all, in that none of them can
be resolved by a comparison of incumbents and challengers on the
basis of characteristics which both have. Thus, the first requirement
of a rational comparative renewal policy must be that it recognize
that allocation decisions must often be made on the basis of charac-
teristics unique to one of the applicants, on the grounds that the
public interest in fostering stations with such characteristics may be
more important than the outcome of the standard comparative
issue. In designing such a policy, it will be helpful first to examine
briefly other situations in which the Commission makes license allo-
cations on noncomparative grounds.
[43:573
FCC Comparative Renewal Hearings
A. Basic Qualifications and the 307(b) Issue
Before reaching the comparative issue, the Commission's prac-
tice is first to determine whether there are any noncomparative
policy grounds for decision. In setting such policies, which are based
on the Commission's authority to adopt rules governing the broad-
cast industry, 13 1 the Commission generally utilizes notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedure. In applying the policies to individ-
ual cases, it performs a purely adjudicatory function. The process
is thus much less amorphous and subjective than resolution of the
standard comparative issue.
The Commission has promulgated noncomparative regulations
that concern such important matters as the allocation of frequencies
among geographical areas and different types of broadcast facili-
ties132 and the setting of basic qualifications for licensees. 3 3 The
Commission has adopted rules providing for automatically denying
without hearing applications of multiple-licensees for additional li-
censes, 34 reallocating occupied frequencies to other communities, 135
and automatically denying applications for stations that would
cause interference, either electrical or financial, with preferred types
of stations.'3 These rules have all received judicial approval. In all
of these situations, applications are denied in favor of other appli-
cants, either present or anticipated, without a hearing in which the
rejected applicant can present the merits of its proposal; thus
Ashbacker, strictly speaking, is violated. Nevertheless, the public
interest in the development of uniform regulatory policies governing
'' 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970). See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943).
'2 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.102, 2.104, 2.106 (1973); 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a)(d) (1970).
'3 47 U.S.C. § 303(l) (1970). The Commission's power to set qualifications for licensees
is broad, and includes the authority to disqualify applicants on public policy grounds not
directly related to ability to operate a station. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351
U.S. 192 (1956); see text at notes 172-75 infra. However, an applicant must be given an
opportunity to show why such a policy should not apply to it, and a hearing is required if the
applicant's showing is sufficiently strong. See, e.g., WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C.
Cir. 1969) aff'd on subsequent appeal, 459 F.2d 1203, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972); City
of New York Municipal Broadcasting System v. FCC, 223 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
' ' United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
'= Goodwill Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 325 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Transcontinent Televi-
sion Corp. v. FCC, 308 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
'1' WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d 1286, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (rule denying application
for VHF channel in area reserved for UHF development upheld against argument it violated
Ashbacker); 560 Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (application of
freeze on new nighttime AM stations in areas already receiving AM nighttime service upheld
despite contention that area's only AM service originated in another city and was not oriented
toward local concerns).
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the growth and structure of the industry has consistently been held
to be superior to the right of individual applicants.
In another situation the Commission grants the applicants a
hearing but may allocate the license on the basis of structural poli-
cies without reaching the standard comparative issue. This is the so-
called 307(b) issue, which arises when the Commission is faced with
mutually exclusive applications by qualified applicants who pro-
pose to serve different communities.' 37 The applicants in a 307(b)
issue are compared in order for the Commission to fulfill its statu-
tory mandate to allocate licenses so as to promote the "fair, efficient
and equitable distribution of radio service" among "the several
States and communities.' 3 The criteria used concern the allocation
of stations among communities according to the communities' needs
rather than the merits of the individual applicants. After
taking evidence on the population and degree of community identi-
fication in the affected areas,' 39 the Commission selects the appli-
cant that will best effectuate the goals of providing at least one
" See Anthony, supra note 23, at 85 n.424. The Commission, however, prefers to make
use of rulemaking to allocate channels. See, e.g., In re Amendment of FM Channel Assign-
ments, 4 F.C.C.2d 525, 5 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1530 (1965).
l3 47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (1970).
, ' See, e.g., Rockland Broadcasting Co., 36 F.C.C. 303, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 39 (Rev.
Bd. 1964), aff'd, 36 F.C.C. 1510, 2 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 820 (1964). In cases involving the
question of whether a suburb is a separate community for purpose of the 307(b) issue, the
Commission has established a rebuttable presumption that a proposed suburban station
whose signal contour would penetrate the central city to a significant degree will, for the
purposes of basic signal-strength qualifications and the 307(b) issue, be considered as servic-
ing the city itself. Policy Statement on Section 307(b) Considerations for Standard Broadcast
Stations Involving Suburban Communities, 2 F.C.C.2d 190, 6 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 1901
(1965), aff'd, Northeast Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 400 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
Where the proposed signals of two stations will cover approximately the same area, the
Commission does not consider their point of origin as controlling in a 307(b) issue. See
Goodman-Todson Broadcasting, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 573, 28 P & F RADio REG. 2D 1597 (1973),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Pasadena Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, No. 74-1012, -1019,
-1033, -1034, -1454 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 1975), 35 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 47.
The RKO case involved 307(b) considerations. Fidelity proposed primarily to serve an
area near Los Angeles, called "the Southland," the needs of which it asserted were neglected
by the Los Angeles stations. It requested hearings on a 307(b) issue and a "service philoso-
phy" comparative issue, both of which were denied. RKO General, Inc., 5 F.C.C.2d 517, 8 P
& F RADIo REG. 2D 957 (1966). Judge Bazelon conceded that Fidelity had failed to make the
showing that the Southland was a separate community for a 307(b) issue, but argued that
the failure to consider the service philosophy issue was unjustified. Fidelity Television, Inc.
v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684, 721-25 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W 3263 (U.S. Nov. 4,
1975). Although the Commission's treatment of this issue may indicate a need for a more
flexible approach to the 307(b) issue to insure that distinct communities within a metropoli-
tan area are able to obtain service oriented toward their problems and interests, the Commis-
sion is justified in not wishing to base allocation decisions on "service philosophy" in light of
its experience under Tampa Tribune.
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broadcast service for all persons, maximizing the number of station
choices available to service areas and providing a locally-operated
station for as many communities as possible.4 0 In brief, the Com-
mission has determined, as a matter of policy, that a station which
would provide average, but the only, service for an area is to be
preferred over an applicant which is likely to provide excellent serv-
ice to an area already well-served by other stations.'' This proce-
dure was approved by the Supreme Court in FCC v. Allentown
Broadcasting Co. 2 where, in reversing the Court of Appeals, the
Court observed that the procedure kept "the needs of the com-
munity" from being "subordinated to the ability of an applicant for
another locality."" 3
The Commission's 307(b) criteria have escaped the scathing
criticism directed at its standard comparative issue criteria.' 4 It
seems clear that the 307(b) issue is more capable of fair and objec-
tive application and that it is entirely reasonable for the Commis-
sion to dispose of applications on 307(b) grounds where appropriate
without comparing the merits of the applicants. The success of this
procedure suggests that when the Commission can reasonably re-
solve a comparative hearing on the basis of a public need for a type
of broadcasting service that only one applicant will provide, such
disposition is preferrable to application of the standard comparative
issue. This type of procedure should be the foundation for a re-
vamped comparative renewal hearing.
B. Issues in a Comparative Renewal Hearing
After assuring itself that both applicants are qualified, the
Commission should first determine whether any policy grounds call
for awarding the license to either the incumbent or to the chal-
lenger; if so, the hearing would terminate. If not, the Commission
should proceed to the standard comparative issue, but should treat
the two as equals; the incumbent's record should be irrelevant at
"I See First Report and Order, in re Revision of FM Broadcast Allocation Rules, 33
F.C.C. 309 (1962).
"' See, e.g., Meredith Colon Johnston, 18 F.C.C.2d 168, 16 P & F RADio REG. 2D 491 (Rev.
Bd. 1969); Albuquerque Broadcasting Co., 25 F.C.C. 683, 785-87, 16 P & F RADIO REG. 765,
856-57 (1958), afl'd sub nom. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. FCC, 280
F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
I 349 U.S. 358 (1955).
m Id. at 361-62.
'" For example, the most carefully detailed indictment of the modem comparative hear-
ing system extant devotes only three pages to 307(b) issues, with no criticisms. Anthony,
supra note 23, at 85-87.
19761
The University of Chicago Law Review [43:573
this point because the Commission no longer seriously attempts to
predict licensee performance through the standard comparative
issue4 5 and it has already been determined that no noncompara-
tive policy favors retaining the incumbent. Two broad noncompara-
tive policies could be considered: promoting stability in the broad-
cast industry, and providing access to broadcast facilities to ex-
cluded segments of the population. The first pulls towards granting
the licensee's renewal application, the second ordinarily towards the
challenger. Other policies could be revealed in the course of rule-
making.
1. Stability. At the outset, a distinction must be drawn be-
tween the public's interest in stability and the individual stations'
interest in retaining their licenses. The Commission's policies in the
past have been too solicitous of the latter under the guise of concern
for the former. The Communications Act expressly states that licen-
sees acquire no interest in the use of a frequency beyond the terms
of their licenses. 4' Thus a stability policy is a legitimate basis for
license allocation only to the extent that it protects the public from
a reduction in the level of service.
The stability policy is properly based on the perception that in
some circumstances the public interest is best served by giving in-
cumbents a reasonable expectation that their licenses will be re-
"I This discussion assumes the standard comparative issue will be comprised of the
present structural integration and diversification policies. See note 62 supra.
"1 47 U.S.C. § 309(h) (1970). Although some contrary judicial authority exists, the pre-
dominant, and correct, position has been stated by the Court of Appeals: "The public interest
is not disturbed if A is destroyed by B, so long as B renders the required service." Carrol
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 258 F.2d 440, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Carroll is the leading case on
whether the FCC may consider economic harm to existing stations in an advertising market
in determining whether to license a new station. The court held that the Commission must
do so when, and only when, the potential harm is great enough to cause an overall decrease
in the level of service available to the area. It thus reconciled FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 136 (1939), in which the Supreme Court observed that since broadcasting
obviously requires a large capital investment which is threatened by the three-year licensing
scheme, Congress must have intended for some instability in the industry, with FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), in which the Court held that the Commis-
sion may consider economic injury to broadcasters when it affects the public interest.
Some implicit support for the concept of rights and equities flowing from prior possession
of a license may be found in the handful of cases dealing with comparative hearings in which
one of the applicants has been operating on the frequency in question on a four-month
temporary license. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 853-55 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Community Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 363 F.2d 717,
720-22 (D.C. Cir. 1966); South Fla. Television Corp. v. FCC, 349 F.2d 971, 972 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1965). These decisions should not, however, be read as establishing
any absolute right to renewal expectations, but simply as holding that having set down
standards to apply to renewal candidates, the Commission may not arbitrarily refuse to apply
them to one who seeks renewal. See also CHICAGO COMMENT, supra note 5, at 862-66, 871.
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newed without a challenge on the 1965 Policy Statement criteria.
The major broadcasting corporations-which are relatively uninte-
grated and undiversified-have made the long-term investments
necessary for the development of high quality modern broadcasting
largely because they were confident of renewal. The quality of those
broadcasters' programming will undoubtedly decline if they cannot
be assured of renewal despite their structural disadvantages.'47
Although it is obviously in the public interest to encourage such
investments, a stability policy must be designed so as to protect
only those incumbents who have actually made use of their assur-
ance of renewal to provide superior broadcasting.
The Commission's current approach to stability, as manifested
in the 1970 Policy Statement and its subsequent rulemaking proce-
dure, "' is not properly designed to serve this policy. The Commis-
sion has attempted to establish uniform, industry-wide standards,
compliance with which would entitle an applicant to renewal on
stability grounds. But the standard as designed can be readily met
by average licensees, and is thus an inappropriate basis for prefer-
ring incumbents, since an otherwise qualified challenger would pre-
sumably be just as capable of meeting the normal industry stan-
dard. If the level of service to be provided is the same, the public
interest is better served by having the service provided by the sta-
tion which best meets the Commission's structural criteria. An in-
"7 The lack of renewal expectations also arguably discourages investment in the industry
and thus prevents the expansion of service to underserved areas. This argument applies
primarily to small, unprofitable broadcasting markets where a station might have to struggle
along for several license terms before becoming profitable. See Hearings, supra note 66, at
22. Licenses for stations in the established markets, which are usually the subject of compara-
tive challenges, are enormously profitable, according to some studies, returning over twice
their depreciated investment in a single three-year license term. See Broadcasting in America
and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma Case Study, 14 F.C.C.2d 1, 14 (1968)
(statement by Cox & Johnson, Comm'rs); Hearings, supra note 66, at 114. Thus, although
the Commission should give licensees struggling to establish a station in an underserved area
some expectation of renewal in order not to discourage investment in such stations, there is
little or no justification for doing the same on these grounds in an established and profitable
market, since there is little danger that frequencies in such areas would be unoccupied as a
result.
The Commission has rejected such dual treatment, stating "certainly, it would make no
sense to apply the [1970] policy statement only to losing operations and to deny its benefits
to any station which is operating in the black. This would hardly be an inducement to good
operation." Petitions for Rulemaking, in re Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hear-
ings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 24 F.C.C.2d 383, 384-85 (1970) (reconsideration
denied). The Commission's argument appears to be that the policy proposed would induce
licensees to run an unprofitable station, so that they could be assured of retaining their
licenses and lose even more money in the future, which hardly seems likely.
'' See text and notes at notes 81-84 supra.
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cumbent should be preferred on stability grounds only when its
record demonstrates broadcasting service superior to that which
could have been provided by a licensee not assured of renewal.14
While a superior record is a strong factor in favor of an incum-
bent, it should not be dispositive. Other noncomparative issues
could outweigh it."" However, an incumbent with an inferior record
should automatically be disqualified. Given the crowded condition
of the frequencies, if a licensee fails to meet even average service
standards, its frequency should, if possible, be awarded to another
qualified applicant. In this area, the Commission's "substantial
service" standards"' could form the minimum threshold of quality
necessary to withstand comparative renewal challenge.
If this initial inquiry does not produce either a finding of supe-
rior or insubstantial service, no further consideration should be
given to the incumbent's record. The standard comparative issue
would then come into play (unless the access issue were dispositive)
and the incumbent's record becomes irrelevant. Although ignoring
"' The problem of defining the level of service which should warrant renewal is the most
difficult problem posed by this approach. Ideally, there should be no fixed standard. The
Commission's task should be to distinguish between stations which provide the minimum
level of broadcasting service which is required of them, which it can be assumed that any
station would do, and stations which make use of their expectancy of renewal to do more than
just what is required of them to improve the quality of their programming. The focus should
be not on what level of service is achieved, but on whether the licensee has passed up
opportunities for public-interest programming in order to maximize short-term profit. No
public interest is served by giving such a broadcaster an expectation of renewal, as it will
not affect its conduct. Nevertheless, all broadcasters, no matter how public-spirited, have a
legitimate interest in knowing the Commission's expectations, and consequently there will
be a natural tendency for some kind of uniform standards to evolve. The Commission's
current approach makes an easily-attainable percentage of public-interest programming the
only requirement for renewal and makes no effort to distinguish between the licensee that
meets that standard as a normal cost of doing business and the licensee that goes beyond
the standard and actively seeks to do all it can to improve its service. The public interest
requires that only the latter be assured of renewal.
In order to make this distinction, it will probably be desirable for the Commission to
focus not so much on the output of stations as on their management policies, to determine
which stations are actually making use of their renewal expectancies in the public interest.
The Citizens court seemed to be looking to this approach when it suggested that the Commis-
sion examine the percentage of profits a station had reinvested in programming improve-
ments. 447 F.2d at 1213 n.35. This suggestion has been rejected by the Commission, Southern
Broadcasting Co., 34 F.C.C.2d 908, 24 P & F RADio REC. 2D 296 (Rev. Bd. 1972), but the
possibility is clearly one which should be examined if the Commission were to adopt the
approach suggested here. In addition, such a criterion would have the desirable effect of
encouraging the major broadcasting corporations to reinvest a greater share of their profits
in programming, with corresponding benefits to the public.
"' Actually, as in the basic qualifications, the challenger may be entitled to demonstrate
that this rule should not be applied to it. See note 133 supra.
" See notes 100-02 supra.
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a licensee's record in deciding on renewal seems intuitively un-
sound, and it clearly goes against the Commission's grain,'5 2 it has
been shown how the consideration of incumbents' records distorts
the comparative criteria.'5 3 Further, the exclusion of the incum-
bent's record follows logically from the structure of the proposed
hearing procedure. The record is relevant only to predicting the level
of service to be rendered in the future, which, since 1965, is not at
issue in the standard comparative issue. 54 If only superior incum-
bents are to be accorded any renewal expectancy, and the incum-
bent has already been found not to be superior, then its record no
longer possesses decisional relevance.
It must be recognized, however, that this procedure could be
exploited by what turns out to be an inferior broadcaster which
tailors its application in accordance with the comparative criteria
in order to displace an incumbent whose service, while not warrant-
ing renewal on the basis of the stability issue, is at least average.
This problem, however, is not unique to the comparative renewal
procedure, but is inherent in the Commission's inability to predict
licensee performance; the dimensions of the problem can be attrib-
uted to the Commission's failure to monitor the performance of its
licensees effectively. 55 To prevent replacing licensees that have pro-
vided adequate service in the past with inferior broadcasters, the
Commission could in this situation use its power to grant condi-
tional licenses.'51 For example, if the basis for the challenger's supe-
riority is a superior integration showing, the Commission could
make its license conditional on the requirement that it make no
"I But see Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 23 P & F RADio REG. 2D 521 (Rev.
Bd. 1972), rev'd sub nom. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
986 (1974). See also Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C.2d 618, 19 P & F RADIO REG. 2D
851 (1970).
' See text and notes at notes 106-26 supra. As Chief Justice, then Judge, Burger pointed
out in an early case: "To argue . . . that [consideration of an incumbent's prior operation
of a facilityl may weigh in the balance of an otherwise close question is not a challenge to
the good faith of the triers; it is a recognition that they are mortal men." Community Broad-
casting Co. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 753, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
" Under the 1965 Policy Statement, the incumbent's record is mildly relevant to the
integration criterion in that experience of the applicant's owners, as opposed to the record of
the applicant itself, is considered. 1965 Policy Statement, supra note 22, at 396, 5 P & F RADIO
REG. 2D at 1910-11. The significance of this factor must be kept carefully in check to prevent
indirect distortion of the comparative criteria. Cf. Community Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC,
363 F.2d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("experience" and "past performance" contrasted).
See text and note at note 66 supra.
' The Commission has authority to prescribe conditions in licenses, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303(r),
309(h) (1970), and to revoke licenses for failure to comply with such conditions, 47 U.S.C. §
312(a) (1970). See Anthony, supra note 23, at 91-97.
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material changes in its station management without Commission
approval. Similarly, a challenger that prevailed on diversification
grounds could be forbidden from acquiring any other media inter-
ests, or a challenger that prevailed on the standard comparative
issue could be forbidden from transferring its license to a less quali-
fied broadcaster. 157 These possibilities should be carefully explored
by the Commission in rulemaking proceedings, with care taken that
the procedures developed do not have the effect of unduly discour-
aging legitimate challenges.
2. Access. A second possible threshold standard, based on
the policy of providing access to the broadcast industry to segments
of the population not currently served, has three facets: providing
minority group access to communications facilities, allocating fre-
quencies for specialized programming, and 307(b) considerations,
previously considered in another context.'58 A strong showing on any
of these issues could balance out a strong stability showing and
require resort to the standard comparative issue, or could entitle a
challenger 59 to receive a license over an incumbent that had not
made a strong showing on the stability issue.
a. Minority Group Access. The issue of providing access to
communications media for minority groups raises very troubling
first amendment questions.' A policy of allocating licenses within
an area in accordance with the demographic makeup of that area
would alleviate these problems to some extent. There would be a
reduced need for the Commission to try to compel, for example,
white media owners to serve the interest of the black community,'6'
since minority group members would presumably have ready access
to the airwaves.
Granting a preference to applications filed by members of racial
and ethnic minorities entails formidable difficulties, however, and
the Commission has tended to avoid doing so16 even in the face of
"I Commission approval, governed by the public interest, convenience and necessity
standard, is required for the transfer of licenses. 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1974 Supp.).
'a See text and notes at notes 139-44 supra.
'9 Theoretically, of course, there is no reason why any of the considerations described in
this section could not favor the incumbent, and the incumbent would be free to urge any of
them. However, it is unlikely that a challenger would attempt to displace a licensee who not
only was supported by the stability issue but by some other structural policy.
" See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv.
20, 43-52 (1975).
6I See, e.g., Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 50 F.C.C.2d 461, 32 P & F RADio REG.
2D 539 (1975).
I, The Commission has recently declined to incorporate any special consideration for
minority ownership into its station allocation rules. Report and Order, in re Amendment of
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growing judicial pressure.' 3 Following dicta in Citizens,'64 for exam-
ple, the Court of Appeals, in TV 9, Inc. v. FCC,'5 remanded a
comparative hearing decision in which the Commission had refused
to give any consideration to the fact that one of the applicants
included a substantial number of black persons in its ownership and
management structure. Thus, the Court of Appeals has recognized
a public interest in providing licenses for certain social groups'66
which the Commission could apply as it currently applies the 307(b)
issue to provide licenses to geographic communities.
Two special problems would arise by employing the access issue
as a preliminary noncomparative question. First, even though a
minority owned station may be entitld to some frequency in an area,
it does not necessarily follow that the public interest would be
served by giving it any particular incumbent's frequency. The Com-
mission could examine major service areas in which the license allo-
cation structure does not reflect the social structure, determine how
many frequencies should be allocated to minority broadcasters, and
make them available by refusing renewal to the licensees with the
worst records.
It would be difficult, however, for the Commission to make such
a determination: the comparative criteria of the 1965 Policy
Statement would not be relevant because the issue is responsiveness
to the programming needs of a particular community; if the Com-
mission were to attempt to make such a determination, it would
have to develop a new mechanism which would necessarily tax fur-
ther its already strained resources. When such a challenge is made,
moreover, it is reasonable to expect that the challenger will go after
the station in the area with the worst record.' e7 Since a challenger
would probably study the records of the various incumbents very
Part 73 of the Commission's Rules Regarding AM Station Assignment, 54 F.C.C.2d 1, 22, 34
P & F RADIO REC.. 2D 603, 626 (1975); cf. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17-18,
23 P & F RADIO R.. 2 D 521, 542-44 (Rev. Bd. 1972), rev'd sub noma. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 986 (1974). The Commission has taken service to
minority groups into account in consideration of applications to expand service, where it has
an existing record of such service to examine. See, e.g., Mel-Lin, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 165, 18 P
& F RAoIO Racn. 2n 787 (1970).
' See generally 52 Tax. L. Rav. 806 (1974).
"' See note 128 supra.
" 495 F.2d 929 (1973).
" The dicta in Citizens, 447 F.2d at 1213 n.36, and the holding in TV 9 have been read
together as establishing a policy in favor of increasing the number of minority-owned stations,
regardless of the effect on service offered. See 52 TEx. L. REv. 806, 813 (1974).
", Cf. RKO General, Inc., 44 F.C.C.2d 149, 194-95, 16 P & F RADIO RG. 2D 1181, 1234-
35 (Hearing Examiner 1969) (initial decision). Since licenses are issued so that all licenses in
a state expire on the same day, a challenger has its pick of targets.
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carefully before risking up to $250,000 on a challenge,'68 the Com-
mission could probably allow the market to handle this problem
itself.
The second problem is a variant of that already discussed in the
context of the comparative renewal procedure generally. There is a
substantial possibility that this policy could be abused by sham
applications in which minority members file an application on be-
half of silent white backers. Here again, the Commission may wish
to use conditional licenses and to scrutinize with extra care the re-
newal applications of successful challengers. On the other hand,
the Commission must be careful not to inhibit all minority applica-
tions through protective restrictions.
b. Specialized Format. The problem of allocating frequen-
cies for specialized programming has indirectly arisen in the recent
"format change" cases, in which the Court of Appeals has required
the Commission to hold hearings before allowing a licensee that has
specialized in a particular kind of programming to transfer its
license to one that plans to use a mass-appeal format. In the leading
case of Citizens Committee to Preserve the Voice of the Arts in
Atlanta v. FCC,169 the court observed:
[I]t is surely in the public interest . . for all major aspects
of contemporary culture to be accomodated by the commonly
owned public resources whenever that is technically and eco-
nomically feasible. 7 "
Thus, as with minority access, the Court of Appeals has a recog-
nized public interest in specialized programming that the Commis-
sion could employ as it employs the 307(b) issue.
The major difficulty with using special format considerations as
a preliminary issue is that it would require the Commission once
again to allocate licenses on the basis of predictions of future serv-
ice. Whereas increasing the number of minority-owned stations is
desirable per se on policy grounds, inclusion of the specialized for-
" Hearings, supra note 66, at 38.
436 F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See also Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC,
506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Citizens Committee to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d
926 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Hartford Communication Committee v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
generally Note, Judicial Review of FCC Program Diversity Regulations, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
401, 419-34 (1975).
170 436 F.2d at 269. In passing on a format change application, the Commission must
consider the size of the audience for the specialized programming, the station's economic need
to change formats, and the existence of other sources of the programming. Id. at 269-72.
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mat issue would require the Commission to predict whether an ap-
plicant really intends to implement its programming proposals."'
Consequently, the specialized format issue should not be applied in
comparative renewal cases except where an applicant can clearly
demonstrate, on the basis of a past record of operating such facili-
ties, a substantial likelihood that it will in fact implement its pro-
posals. Continuation of its license should be conditional on its con-
tinuing its special format.
C. The Commission's Authority to Adopt the Proposed Procedure
Whether adoption of the proposed procedure is within the au-
thority of the Commission essentially involves two questions:
whether a procedure under which a challenger's application can be
denied solely on the basis of the incumbent's record through the
stability issue deprives the challenger of its right to a hearing under
Ashbacker and Citizens, and whether disposition of a comparative
hearing solely on the basis of the structural issues outlined above
violates Johnston Broadcasting.
As noted above,' 2 the Commission has been permitted under
Storer and its progeny to deny the application of an unqualified
applicant without a hearing. The Citizens court dismissed Storer on
the grounds that the 1970 Policy Statement did not involve
qualification standards of the Commission.7 3 The use of the term
"qualifications" in this context, however, is question-begging. Sto-
rer's application was not denied without a hearing because Storer
was incapable of operating a station properly,' but because, as a
matter of policy, the Commission had determined that the fre-
quency should be occupied instead by a broadcaster with fewer
media interests. The Commission was upheld in this practice even
though a competing application had not yet been filed and thus the
frequency might eventually be allocated to an inferior broadcaster.
The Citizens court was thus incorrect in dismissing Storer as wholly
inapplicable and should have instead focused on the reasonableness
' The Commission has refused to adopt special format rules in its allocation policies,
stating: "As we have consistently held, program formats are by their nature transitory, and
we have accordingly refused to consider them in designing and implementing our allocation
system .... " Report and Order, in re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules
Regarding AM Station Assignment, 54 F.C.C.2d 1, 22, 34 P & F RADio REG. 2D 603, 626 (1975);
see text and notes at notes 33-36 supra.
02 See text and notes at notes 132-36 supra.
,, 447 F.2d at 1212 n.34.
351 U.S. at 201.
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of the Commission's classification.1 75
If the Court of Appeals were to scrutinize this proposal under
Storer, it could distinguish Citizens. It is easy to conclude that an
otherwise qualified challenger should not be considered unqualified
and denied a hearing because the incumbent has an average operat-
ing record: in this case it must be assumed that the applicants will
render roughly equivalent service and thus the public interest calls
for allocating the license on the basis of other policies properly de-
termined in a comparative hearing. It is another thing, however, to
make this argument when the incumbent has an outstanding rec-
ord: in this case there is a strong public interest in continuing the
outstanding service that, like the 307(b) policy of providing an un-
serviced area with some service, could override the challenger's indi-
vidual interest. Because the Commission is unable to predict
whether an untested challenger will render equally superior service,
the public interest would call for retaining the incumbent. The pro-
posed revamping of the comparative renewal hearing could, there-
fore, pass muster after Citizens as long as the Commission can effec-
tively separate outstanding incumbents from average ones and
apply the policy only to the former. 7 '
Johnston Broadcasting also would not bar implementation of
the proposed procedure. As noted before, in Allentown Broadcasting
the Court held that the Commission need not compare all relevant-
differences between two applicants when disposing of a comparative
hearing on 307(b) grounds.'77 Although the 307(b) issue rests on a
specific, clear statutory mandate, the Commission apparently has
authority to develop special criteria to apply in comparative renewal
cases. The Communications Act originally required the Commission
to judge renewal applications under the same standards it used in
judging original applications.7 8 In 1952, the Act was amended to
provide simply that renewals were to be governed by the public
"I In Kessler v. FCC, 326 F.2d 673, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 1963), the court interpreted Storer
to permit the Commission to impose a freeze on granting new AM licenses, but held that it
must hold a comparative hearing between two mutually exclusive applicants, one filed just
before the effective date of the freeze and one just after. The freeze policy could not be used
to prefer one applicant over another where the only difference between the applicants-the
time their applications were filed-bore no relationship to the public policy behind the freeze:
restricting the number of AM stations.
,71 If the proposed stability issue can be upheld, there should be little problem in uphold-
ing the access issues. The stability issue is much closer to the invalidated 1970 Policy State-
ment. See text and notes at notes 86-102 supra.
"I See text at notes 140-43 supra.
17- Ch. 652, § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1084 (1934).
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interest, convenience and necessity,' 9 thus suggesting that Congress
intended to free the Commission to develop special standards to
govern comparative renewal situations.18
In any event, the concept of "relevant differences between the
applicants" has been greatly altered since Johnston Broadcasting.
Today, the Commission, with the Court of Appeals' acquiescence,
generally considers the applicants' relative degree of conformity to
its model of an ideal licensee to be the sole relevant difference. Only
occasionally does the Commission consider differences in proposed
programming, because they afford no basis for a rational choice. If
the Commission considers all the noncomparative factors in relation
to the applicants, there seems to be no reason why it cannot simi-
larly refuse to consider the standard comparative criteria if the allo-
cative choice should be made on the basis of other policies.' 8' In-
deed, although the Citizens court invoked Johnston, it clearly con-
templated that renewal hearings would be resolved according to
standards similar to those outlined in the proposed procedure.' 82
Thus neither Ashbacker, Johnston nor Citizens bars implementa-
tion of the proposed procedure.
CONCLUSION
The FCC has thus far been unable to formulate standards for
rational license allocation in comparative renewal situations. Hav-
ing recognized that the comparative criteria of the 1965 Policy
Statement-which are based on policies concerning the structure of
the broadcast industry rather than attempts to predict which appli-
cant will provide the best service-do not furnish reliable guides in
cases where one applicant has been operating on the frequency in
question, the Commission must now develop a mechanism that will
enable it, when appropriate, to allocate licenses on the basis of non-
comparative policies without violating either incumbents' or chal-
lengers' statutorily guaranteed right to a meaningful hearing. In
treading this fine line, the Commission has a judicially-approved
model to follow. Under Storer the Commission need not grant a
'7 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970), as amended by Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 5, 66 Stat.
714.
1, See Geller, The Comparative Renewal Process in Television: Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 61 VA. L. REV. 471, 472-73 (1975). But see Citizens Communication Center v. FCC,
447 F.2d 1201, 1206 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
"' For an argument that a similar proposed system would not be barred by Johnston,
see Anthony, supra note 23, at 75-84.
1" 447 F.2d at 1213 nn. 35 & 36; see text at notes 86-102 supra.
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hearing to a demonstrably unqualified applicant and under
Allentown Broadcasting it may define qualification on the basis of
the public's need for different types of broadcast services, as it does
in resolving the 307(b) issue. Using these principles as a model, the
Commission could embody its concern with promoting such policies
as stability in the industry and minority group access to the air-
waves in qualification standards that could be applied in compara-
tive renewal situations. Such an approach would have numerous
advantages: the Commission could base its decisions on objective,
noncomparative determinations where appropriate; an expectation
of renewal for a superior record could be used to encourage high
quality programming without shielding mediocre licensees from
competition; the basis for comparative renewal decisions could be
made clear and explicit; and, in cases where the non-comparative
criteria are not dispositive, the Commission would have no reason
not to apply the 1965 Policy Statement criteria and thus could
implement its diversification-integration structural policies. Such a
mechanism, if formulated through rulemaking procedures and de-
signed carefully to avoid giving any party an advantage not based
on a defined public interest, would not offend the right to a hearing
guaranteed challengers as well as incumbents by Ashbacker, John-
ston Broadcasting, and Citizens.18 3
Durward J. Gehring
"3 The Citizens court itself stated: "The court recognizes that the public itself will suffer
if incumbent licensees cannot reasonably expect renewal when they have rendered superior
service." 447 F.2d at 1213 n.35.
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